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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay examines Judge Richard Posner’s jurisprudence 
on justiciability—the subject matter jurisdiction limits on federal 
courts. Judge Posner’s decisions reflect a particularly liberal and 
expansive view of standing and associated limits on federal court 
jurisdiction, combined with a narrow view of statutory and other 
subconstitutional limitations. Standing and related justiciability 
doctrines are a natural place for a visionary jurist like Posner to 
make a mark. Standing doctrine is famously confused, with lines 
of inconsistent Supreme Court decisions giving much to choose 
from to those who, in the spirit of Justice Antonin Scalia, favor 
robust Article III restrictions on the subject matter jurisdiction of 
the federal courts and those who, in the spirit of Justice Stephen 
Breyer, support loosening these restrictions.1 The ongoing aca-
demic debate over the doctrine, which has emphasized the inade-
quacy of the doctrine’s purported justifications, also invites juris-
prudential innovation. 
Posner’s pragmatic judicial philosophy and skepticism of doc-
trine, combined with an ongoing concern about the workload of 
federal courts, led him to develop a characteristic approach to 
Article III jurisdiction. However, Posner’s expansive approach to 
justiciability—which he has described as “pragmatic” or “proba-
bilistic”—goes far beyond what Supreme Court precedents 
dictate. Moreover, in the name of opposition to what he sees as 
 
 † Professor of Law, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School. The au-
thor clerked for Judge Posner in 2001–2002. 
 1 Earlier work has explored how one of Posner’s major standing cases departs from 
even Justice Breyer’s expansive view of the doctrine. See, for example, Bradford C. Mank, 
Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer’s Approach to 
Standing than to Justice Scalia’s, 50 Houston L Rev 71, 119 (2012). This Essay examines 
a wider range of standing cases, as well as Posner’s approach to other constitutional and 
statutory justiciability doctrines. 
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formalistic and ad hoc doctrinal rationalizations for the standing 
doctrine, Posner’s justiciability cases recapitulate many of these 
weaknesses. 
In his academic work and some early cases, Judge Posner 
strongly favored a robust view of Article III justiciability limits. 
In particular, he embraced the view that Article III’s justiciability 
limitations2 constrain federal courts to redressing “injuries of the 
same general sort redressed by common law courts in the 
eighteenth century.”3 Far from dismissing these limits on judicial 
review as anachronisms, or mechanistic originalism, Posner un-
derstood their principal purpose to be rooted in the separation of 
powers.4 In this view, justiciability restrictions serve as a built-in 
check on the powers of the courts relative to the political 
branches, without which the authority of the former may seem 
limitless. As Judge Posner put it, courts might “have their wings 
clipped if they did not limit their power by minimizing the occa-
sions on which to exercise it.”5 
But on the bench, Judge Posner developed a very limited view 
of Article III justiciability doctrines. The most prominent of the 
Article III rules is standing—a doctrine famously described as 
confused, pointless, and archaic by commentators and known for 
its zig-zagging lines of Supreme Court decisions.6 The widespread 
academic view that standing “serves no useful purpose,”7 and the 
broad space left by inconsistent Supreme Court decisions, make 
it a natural place for Posner’s pragmatic jurisprudence. 
Posner’s standing decisions articulate a broad theory of judi-
cial review, in which standing is largely reducible to the question 
of whether the plaintiff has a cause of action. Posner’s opinions 
also repeatedly emphasize a “probabilistic” approach to standing, 
 
 2 See People Organized for Welfare & Employment Rights v Thompson, 727 F2d 167, 
171 (7th Cir 1984) (opining that a plaintiff’s injury should “at least resemble the type of 
injury that would support a lawsuit under traditional principles of common law or equity; 
it must therefore affect one’s possessions or bodily integrity or freedom of action, however 
expansively defined”). 
 3 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 43 (Harvard 1996). 
See also Thompson, 727 F2d at 171 (opining that a plaintiff’s injury should “at least re-
semble the type of injury that would support a lawsuit under traditional principles of com-
mon law or equity; it must therefore affect one’s possessions or bodily integrity or freedom 
of action, however expansively defined”). 
 4 See Posner, The Federal Courts at 43–44 (cited in note 3). 
 5 Id at 44. 
 6 See, for example, Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 Va L Rev 
1663, 1664–66 (2007). 
 7 Mark V. Tushnet, The “Case or Controversy” Controversy: The Sociology of Article III: 
A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 Harv L Rev 1698, 1705 (1980). 
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in which a statistical possibility that a favorable decision would 
have concrete benefits for the plaintiff is enough to satisfy 
Article III.8 In practice, this means that few plaintiffs, even with 
highly attenuated causal relationships to the complained-of ac-
tion, would fail to satisfy Article III limits. Posner’s standing and 
political question jurisprudence is hard to reconcile with both the 
practice and theory of standing as articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife9 and Clapper v Amnesty 
International.10 It also ignores serious practical functions the 
standing doctrine may serve. 
Part I first describes the doctrine of standing and then shows 
how numerous Posner opinions constitute a frontal assault on it. 
Posner replaces that admitted uncertainty that surrounds the ap-
plication of standing principles to an anything-goes approach that 
carries its own costs. Part II examines Posner’s similarly liberal 
approach to another major justiciability limitation, the political 
question doctrine. Part III shows that while Posner’s cases give 
little weight to traditional justifications for justiciability doc-
trines, particularly those rooted in the separation of powers, they 
do embrace it as a discretionary docket management tool. Thus, 
Posner’s liberal approach to constitutional standing rules is 
matched by a fairly serious application of so-called “prudential” 
or judge-made justiciability limits. Part IV critiques Posner’s ap-
proach to justiciability on the grounds that it does not fully ap-
preciate the pragmatic purposes embedded in the crusty doctrinal 
structure of standing rules. 
I.  STANDING 
Judge Posner’s standing decisions constitute bold challenges 
to both the theory and application of the Supreme Court’s justici-
ability doctrines. In dicta, he comes close to adopting the view 
that such doctrines lack both constitutional basis and practical 
utility.11 In his application of existing tests, he comes close to mak-
ing the Supreme Court’s requirements of standing as devoid of 
effect as he thinks they are of practical purpose. 
 
 8 See, for example, American Bottom Conservancy v United States Army Corps of 
Engineers, 650 F3d 652, 658 (7th Cir 2011); MainStreet Organization of Realtors v Calumet 
City, 505 F3d 742, 744 (7th Cir 2007). 
 9 504 US 555 (1992). 
 10 568 US 398 (2013). 
 11 See American Bottom Conservancy v United States Army Corp of Engineers, 650 
F3d 652, 659–60 (7th Cir 2011). 
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The Supreme Court has described Article III as requiring a 
plaintiff to have an injury with a sufficient degree of concreteness, 
imminence, and nexus with the defendant’s conduct. But the pre-
cise cutoff for what the Court has described as a “concrete” and 
“imminent” injury has been difficult to discern from the cases. 
Posner’s standing cases, however, focus not on the formal rela-
tionship between plaintiffs and the alleged injury but whether 
there is a statistical probability that the defendant’s conduct may 
harm the plaintiff’s interests. However, a closer examination of 
his standing decisions reveals a different kind of formalism: for 
Posner, a “probability” of injury is in practice a shorthand for any 
probability, or rather “not impossibility.” 
A. The Supreme Court’s Standing Jurisprudence and Its 
Difficulties 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly described standing as a 
threshold Article III requirement for adjudication. Standing 
turns on the existence of a particular relationship, or nexus, be-
tween the plaintiff and the challenged government action. The ex-
act nature of the necessary nexus has been difficult for the Court 
to articulate—ironically, given that standing seeks to guard 
against amorphous and inchoate injuries—but the three-part test 
spelled out in Lujan serves as the basic reference point. The cen-
tral requirement is that the plaintiff has an “injury in fact”: an 
injury somehow particular to the plaintiff, as opposed to a societal 
grievance of the kind that might have been treated as public nui-
sance at common law.12 The other two elements—which the Court 
labelled “causation” and “redressability”—often go together: the 
challenged conduct must be a traceable cause of the injury, and 
the remedy sought from the court must have some likelihood of 
ending the injury (which would be impossible if the injury is not 
caused by the conduct in the first place).13 
The injury-in-fact requirement is hardly a model of clarity. 
The nature of the required injury is, the Court admits, “not sus-
ceptible of precise definition.”14 Still, some basic concerns of the 
injury requirement can be teased out. Standing demands that 
 
 12 Lujan, 505 US at 560. 
 13 Id at 560–61. 
 14 Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 751 (1984). 
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courts respond only to “distinct and palpable” harms.15 This limi-
tation most often has bite in ideological litigation by public inter-
est groups. Related to abstractness is a concern about “general” 
rather than “particular” injuries.16 When government action 
harms many people in the same way, none has standing to assert 
the “undifferentiated” injury.17 
One basic difficulty of the jurisdictional “injury” requirement 
is that the existence of an “injury” is also an element of a basic 
prima facie tort case. (The same can be said about the second re-
quirement, causation.) In anticipatory challenges to complex reg-
ulatory action, demonstrating the connection between govern-
ment action and a plaintiff’s legal interests may be even more 
difficult than in a garden-variety tort. Thus, a common academic 
criticism of the injury requirement, emphasized heavily by Judge 
Posner, is that it collapses a merits inquiry into a jurisdictional 
one, requiring courts to determine questions of fact without the 
benefit of any evidence.18 In this view, to say a plaintiff does not 
have an injury is just a judicial guess, an ad hoc assessment of 
probability. 
B. Posner’s Standing 
In a series of decisions, Judge Posner attacked the very exist-
ence of a constitutional requirement of standing and the policy 
justifications for it. Noting the significant academic criticism of 
the standing doctrine, Posner has expressed doubt that Article III 
creates any such limitations.19 Posner’s doctrinal heresy is moti-
vated by his impatience for legal rules that seem to serve no use-
ful purposes. And in his view, standing doctrine does not serve 
the purposes often attributed to it.20 
For example, one justification for requiring a plaintiff to have 
a concrete injury is to ensure vigorous adjudication. Posner, how-
ever, notes that ideological litigants will often be more motivated 
than those whose interest is limited to their own personal injury. 
 
 15 Id (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 16 See Lujan, 505 US at 573–74. 
 17 Id at 575. 
 18 See American Bottom Conservancy, 650 F3d at 659. 
 19 See id at 655–56. 
 20 See id at 656 (arguing that standing doctrine is defensible primarily to the extent 
it serves clear “practical” ends). 
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Indeed, bearing the expense of a lawsuit is in this view evidence 
of a willingness to mount a vigorous defense.21 
Posner’s approach to standing requirements is best illus-
trated in a series of cases in which he narrowly interpreted exist-
ing Supreme Court precedents in cases involving issues that per-
ennially raise justiciability problems—environmental regulation 
and Establishment Clause challenges. 
1. Environmental regulation. 
The environmental case, American Bottom Conservancy v 
United States Army Corp of Engineers,22 reads like a law school 
exam about standing: its facts closely track the major Supreme 
Court precedent on ideological environmental litigation, Lujan, 
but tweaked ever-so-slightly to at least open the possibility of a 
different outcome. In Lujan, the plaintiffs complained that the 
secretary of the interior’s improper interpretation of certain envi-
ronmental regulations would lead to the funding of overseas de-
velopment projects that would harm the habitat of some endan-
gered species.23 The plaintiffs’ claimed injury was a diminution in 
their ability to take delight from these creatures.24 The Court 
ruled that the plaintiffs lacked an Article III injury.25 Their con-
ceptual interest in the animals was not enough.26 
The narrowest view of the holding focuses on the Court’s dis-
cussion of whether the plaintiffs had plans to visit the potentially 
imperiled crocodiles and other fauna. While the plaintiffs in 
Lujan were true animal lovers who had visited the animals’ hab-
itat in the past, the animals lived far away and, at the time of 
their lawsuit, the plaintiffs lacked concrete plans to commune 
with them again.27 Their interest in the aesthetic enjoyment of 
the animals was too amorphous and remote, the Court ruled, to 
constitute an Article III injury.28 
But it is hard to imagine that questions of the courts’ Article III 
powers turn on whether someone has yet bought a ticket to see a 
 
 21 See People Organized for Welfare & Employment Rights v Thompson, 727 F2d 167, 
172 (7th Cir 1984), citing Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A Functional 
Analysis, 86 Harv L Rev 645, 674 (1973). 
 22 650 F3d 652 (7th Cir 2011). 
 23 Lujan, 504 US at 563–64. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id at 562. 
 26 Id at 563. 
 27 Lujan, 504 US at 564. 
 28 Id at 562, 564. 
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crocodile. The real problem with the plaintiffs’ suit involves some 
combination of the amorphous nature of their injury with its lack 
of personal particularity. As the Court emphasized, while aes-
thetic and emotional harms can certainly give rise to justiciable 
cases, a plaintiff must meet a higher standard when the com-
plained of conduct is not in any way directed at them.29 That is 
because vague aesthetic interests in nondirected government con-
duct, several degrees of causation removed from the plaintiffs’ al-
leged injury, are widely shared and bleed into pure policy disa-
greements. The problem with the Lujan claim was that the 
plaintiffs were essentially attempting to relitigate regulatory de-
cisions in which their interests were little different from those of 
the general public. It would make standing doctrine uncommonly 
silly if the plaintiffs could evade a structural Article III limit on 
judicial power with a thousand-dollar outlay on a package tour 
(which, given the stage at which standing decisions occur, they 
would not actually have to go on). 
Yet this is the view of Lujan that Posner took in American 
Bottom Conservancy. That case involved a plan by a waste dis-
posal company to eliminate several acres of wetlands.30 The plain-
tiffs were nature lovers who claimed this would negatively affect 
various species in a way that would limit their aesthetic enjoy-
ment of those species.31 The linkage between the plaintiffs and the 
project was indirect, as was the link between the relief they 
sought and the defendant.32 The plaintiffs did not visit any crea-
tures in the affected wetland, which was private property.33 Ra-
ther, they admired these species from the vantage point of a pub-
lic park half a mile away.34 Nor did the plaintiffs sue the company 
that was going to fill the wetland. Instead, they brought an action 
against a government agency that had issued a permit authoriz-
ing the project.35 
In short, their lawsuit was about government action not di-
rected at them and about land that they had never been on. None-
theless, the public park was close enough, Judge Posner ruled.36 
The key is that the plaintiffs were regular visitors to the park, 
 
 29 Id at 562–63. 
 30 American Bottom Conservancy, 650 F3d at 654. 
 31 Id at 657. 
 32 Id at 657–58. 
 33 See id at 657. 
 34 See American Bottom Conservancy, 650 F3d at 657. 
 35 Id at 656. 
 36 See id at 657. 
1124 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1117 
 
and there was no reason to think that they would not frequent it 
again.37 This was enough for Posner to find Lujan’s limits on jus-
ticiability inapplicable. The plaintiffs did not claim that the birds 
in their “visual field” at the park were the same ones that land in 
the affected wetlands but only that they were of the same spe-
cies.38 Judge Posner, however, thought it sufficient that the park 
was in close proximity to the habitat of the bird species, making 
it possible that some of the same individual birds were involved.39 
The Supreme Court’s application of the injury-in-fact analysis 
focuses on the number of degrees of attenuation that exist be-
tween the plaintiffs’ claimed injury and the challenged govern-
ment action.40 The Supreme Court in Lujan emphasized that the 
test of standing is higher in cases challenging government action 
of which the plaintiff is not the object. When the government ac-
tion is not the direct cause of plaintiffs’ injury, it must at least be 
closely linked to it.41 A probability of benefit is not enough—there 
must be a deeper nexus between the plaintiff and the allegedly 
wrongful conduct. 
Applying that analysis here, one could start by noting that 
the proposed landfill might never be built, regardless of the per-
mit, for a variety of other economic and regulatory reasons.42 Even 
if it is built, the mitigation projects agreed to by the company may 
provide suitable alternate homes for the birds.43 Even if the pro-
ject is built and mitigation is not immediate or complete, the af-
fected birds might themselves find other suitable nearby places 
to rest their feet and wings.44 Even if they do not, and the number 
of birds passing through the area may be reduced, the number 
visible from the park on the biannual occasion of plaintiffs’ visits 
may be entirely undistinguishable.45 Thus the plaintiffs’ injury 
 
 37 See id. 
 38 See American Bottom Conservancy, 650 F3d at 657. 
 39 See id (“They fly all over the place, doubtless including the park, which is only half 
a mile from the wetlands.”). 
 40 See Clapper, 568 US at 410 (enumerating a five-piece “chain of contingencies” in-
tervening between plaintiffs’ claimed injury and the conduct they complained of). 
 41 See Lujan, 504 US at 562. In American Bottom Conservancy, there were at least 
two third-parties to the government action whose conduct would be required to bring about 
the injury—the waste company and the birds. American Bottom Conservancy, 650 F3d 
at 654–55. 
 42 See American Bottom Conservancy, 650 F3d at 658. 
 43 See id at 659–60. 
 44 See id at 660. 
 45 See id. 
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here is four steps removed from the conduct they complain of—
far from what the Court would describe as an injury-in-fact. 
Posner ignored this aspect of Lujan and instead focused on 
the plaintiffs’ ticket to see a crocodile.46 He also took the oppor-
tunity to emphasize the “probabilistic” nature of standing in-
jury.47 Posner correctly emphasized that a standing determina-
tion turns on a fairly preliminary estimation of the imminence of 
an injury, which must be deferential to the plaintiff because of a 
lack of discovery.48 Thus, he found a cognizable injury based on 
the chance that the permit might result in a project on a nearby 
parcel that could reduce the animal traffic through the park (a 
point that was quite unclear given that the waste company would 
offset the wetland by creating another one nearby) in a way that 
would be noticeable to the nature lovers.49 In so doing, he de-
scribed the standing test as “probabilistic”; but what in practice 
this meant was that any probability—thus anything short of im-
possibility—would confer standing.50 This turns standing into an 
inquiry based on pure possibility, as opposed to some concrete 
probability. It is hard to see why one needs a constitutional doc-
trine to screen out impossible claims. 
Moreover, Posner’s holding in American Bottom Conservancy 
largely elides the causation and redressability prongs of the 
Supreme Court’s standing inquiry. In cases like Lujan, causation 
is used to screen out cases in which a governmental policy chal-
lenged by the plaintiff is not a direct cause of the potential injury-
in-fact the plaintiff invokes. Thus, in Lujan, the plaintiffs’ pur-
ported standing was predicated on the extinction of the crocodiles; 
but the government policy they challenged—a regulation that 
provided that foreign aid projects need to undertake explicit in-
quiries into their environmental impact—was not killing any 
 
 46 See American Bottom Conservancy, 650 F3d at 656–57, citing Lujan, 504 US 
at 562–63. 
 47 American Bottom Conservancy, 650 F3d at 658, quoting MainStreet Organization 
of Realtors, 505 F3d at 744. 
 48 See American Bottom Conservancy, 650 F3d at 658. 
 49 See id at 659. 
 50 See id at 658, citing MainStreet Organization of Realtors, 505 F3d at 744 (quota-
tions omitted): 
A suit to redress an injury to the plaintiff is a “case” or “controversy” . . . as long 
as there is some nonnegligible, nontheoretical, probability of harm that the 
plaintiff’s suit if successful would redress. As we have noted repeatedly, the fact 
that a loss or other harm on which a suit is based is probabilistic rather than 
certain does not defeat standing. 
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crocodiles. Similarly, the real culprits, if any, in American Bottom 
Conservancy would be the developers, not the Army Corp of 
Engineers. The plaintiffs sued the latter because they had no con-
ceivable cause of action against the former. Even if the probabil-
istic harm to the wildlife could be considered an “injury in fact,” 
it still would not give the plaintiffs standing under Lujan. 
Equating probability with possibility was repeated by Posner 
in several cases.51 In Tucker v United States Department of 
Commerce,52 a citizen suit challenge to the methods of the decen-
nial census, Posner stressed the mere need for “some probability 
of a tangible benefit” in the form of greater federal funds or more 
congressional districts.53 Yet he went on to find the standing re-
quirement met without any evidence of such a probability, but 
rather because the possibility had not been ruled out.54 While 
there was no evidence that the state would gain through a differ-
ent census method, it was possible. This is not a probability; it is 
a hypothetical possibility, and the benefit to the plaintiff would 
be filtered through numerous intermediate steps, each with an 
indeterminate outcome. In comparison, the Supreme Court, in a 
similar challenge several years later, also found standing satis-
fied, but only after considering detailed evidence that showed a 
“virtual certainty” that the relevant state, and even counties, in 
which the plaintiffs reside would benefit from a change in 
method.55 
2. Establishment Clause 
Posner’s minimalist view of Article III standing rules—and 
his corresponding tendency to read exceptions to it in Supreme 
Court case law in the broadest way—can also be seen in two 2006 
 
 51 See, for example, Bruggeman v Blagojevich, 324 F3d 906, 910 (7th Cir 2003) (in-
volving a challenge by Medicaid beneficiaries seeking to require officials to adopt a plan 
to make it easier for developmentally challenged people to be admitted to certain kinds of 
care facilities): 
The potential benefit to them from the relief that they seek thus is speculative. 
But not so speculative as to negate standing, which is a matter of probabilities 
rather than certainties. 
 52 958 F2d 1411 (7th Cir 1992). 
 53 Id at 1415. 
 54 See id at 1415–16. 
 55 See Department of Commerce v United States House of Representatives, 525 US 
316, 330–31 (1999). 
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Establishment Clause cases.56 The Establishment Clause is a 
good acid test of standing theories. That is because most practices 
challenged under the provision—such as public religious displays 
or spending on religious programs—are by definition not “aimed” 
at anyone, nor do they infringe on any classic common law rights. 
The injury they cause is largely conceptual and universal (the be-
liever is as protected by the First Amendment as the dissenter). 
In response to such difficulties, which might lead to the un-
comfortable conclusion that the Establishment Clause is entirely 
nonjusticiable, the Supreme Court has at times applied a some-
what more relaxed standing test to Establishment Clause chal-
lenges. In Flast v Cohen,57 the Court ruled that taxpayers have 
standing to challenge legislative appropriations for religious pur-
poses, because the Framers understood such use of public funds 
as being individually harmful for antiestablishmentists and con-
stituting the particular injury the Clause seeks to guard against.58 
Many academics saw Flast as establishing, at the least, a broad 
exemption of the Establishment Clause from traditional Article III 
restrictions or, at the most, as sowing the seeds for a rejection of 
an injury requirement in favor of Professor William Fletcher’s 
“cause of action” theory of standing.59 However, that is not how 
the Court saw matters. In a series of subsequent decisions, it 
greatly limited Flast to its facts, explaining that only actual items 
of legislative appropriation are subject to the Flast rule.60 Other 
kinds of in-kind or general-account support for religious projects 
do not give rise to taxpayer standing. 
Posner took the course of reading Flast broadly; he thought 
it represented a suggestion that the standing doctrine was pru-
dential. In Freedom from Religion Foundation v Chao,61 Posner 
ruled that taxpayers had standing to challenge funding of pro-
grams by the President’s Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives.62 These programs were not funded by specific congres-
sional appropriations, as in Flast, but rather by the general White 
 
 56 See generally Freedom from Religion Foundation v Chao, 433 F3d 989 (7th Cir 
2006); Laskowski v Spellings, 443 F3d 930 (7th Cir 2006). 
 57 392 US 83 (1968). 
 58 Id at 103–04. 
 59 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L J 221, 290–91 (1988). 
See also Part IV. 
 60 See Hein v Freedom from Religion Foundation, 551 US 587, 605–09 (2007) (dis-
cussing case law evolution that narrowed the Flast rule). 
 61 433 F3d 989 (7th Cir 2006). 
 62 Id at 996–97. 
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House budget, and were thus further removed from the particular 
Flast “injury.”63 Yet Posner concluded, over Judge Kenneth 
Ripple’s dissent, that it was close enough. The heart of their dis-
pute was whether standing limitations such as the injury require-
ment are seen as a hard constitutional rule, and thus whether 
plaintiffs with undifferentiated injuries would have to fall into 
some clear exception, or whether the injury requirement is itself 
a prudential exception to broad federal court jurisdiction.64 
Posner’s opinion focused on the incoherence of Supreme Court 
standing cases and paid particular attention to the liberal ones.65 
Judge Ripple, in his dissent, emphasized the essential purposes 
of standing as a fundamental limit on federal court power.66 Sub-
sequently, in Hein v Religious Freedom Foundation,67 the 
Supreme Court overruled Posner’s decision.68 
Another odd Establishment case, Laskowski v Spellings,69 in-
volved a taxpayer challenge to a one-time grant to the University 
of Notre Dame to train teachers at the Catholic institution.70 By 
the time the lawsuit was heard, the money had been spent, and 
no further appropriators were in the offing (the provision of the 
funds to a religious program at Notre Dame appears to have been 
an oversight).71 Judge Posner held that the case was not moot, 
because the plaintiffs’ injury could still be redressed if the school 
refunds the money to Congress.72 In this view, Establishment 
Clause injuries include not just governmental appropriation of 
the money to religious purposes but the resulting depletion of the 
fisc—an ongoing injury that sounds like the classic nonjusticiable 
general grievance, sometimes called “taxpayer standing.” 
Posner’s adoption of this injury shows quite clearly his expansive 
view of Article III standing.73 
 
 63 See id at 992–93. 
 64 Compare id at 991–92, with id at 997 (Ripple dissenting). 
 65 See Freedom from Religion Foundation, 433 F3d at 991–93. 
 66 Id at 998 (Ripple dissenting) (“A lawsuit based on such undifferentiated injury—a 
mere disagreement with the government policy—is hardly the case and controversy within 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”). 
 67 551 US 587 (2007). 
 68 Id at 593. 
 69 443 F3d 930 (7th Cir 2006). 
 70 Id at 933. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id at 934. 
 73 The Supreme Court vacated Posner’s ruling in the case for reconsideration in light 
of Hein. With the Supreme Court having made clear that Flast was a unique exception, 
and not a basis for liberalizing standing, Posner was forced to join Judge Sykes’s opinion 
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As Judge Sykes put it in her dissent: 
[T]he majority holds that a recipient of a federal grant may 
be ordered to repay the grant as a remedy in a taxpayer law-
suit alleging that the government violated the Establishment 
Clause in making or insufficiently monitoring the grant. The 
majority achieves this result by importing the common law 
doctrine of restitution—a private law concept—into the pub-
lic law realm of Establishment Clause litigation, vesting tax-
payers with a unique sort of qui tam–like authority to sue 
private parties for reimbursement of the Treasury when the 
government is alleged to have committed an Establishment 
Clause violation. . . . This is a dramatic expansion of taxpayer 
standing, and there is no authority for it.74 
II.  POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
Posner expressed even greater skepticism of the political 
question doctrine, which holds that certain issues closely related 
to the basic structure of government cannot be adjudicated by fed-
eral courts.75 In his long tenure on the bench, he never deemed a 
case nonjusticiable on political question grounds. He reversed 
several dismissals on political question grounds, expressing doubt 
about the very existence of the doctrine. As with his standing de-
cisions, Posner placed great weight on academic criticism aimed 
at the “scope, rationale, provenance, and legitimacy” of nontex-
tual Article III limitations while paying little attention to its not 
infrequent actual use by courts.76 Indeed, he has described it as 
“undeserving of the dignity of a special doctrine.”77 
In Tucker, a case in which citizens of Illinois challenged the 
Census Bureau’s “actual enumeration” requirement, Posner re-
jected a dismissal of the case on political grounds (as well as on 
standing grounds, discussed above).78 Reversing the district 
court’s political question dismissal, he said there was no reason 
 
on remand, which held the case nonjusticiable. Laskowski v Spellings, 546 F3d 822, 827 
(7th Cir 2008). 
 74 Laskowski, 443 F3d at 939 (Sykes dissenting). 
 75 See Jill Jaffe, Note, The Political Question Doctrine: An Update in Response to 
Recent Case Law, 38 Ecol L Q 1033, 1037 (2011). 
 76 Tucker, 958 F2d at 1415 (suggesting that challenge to the Census Bureau’s meth-
ods of conducting decennial census is not a political question). But see id at 1419 (Ripple 
concurring in the judgment). 
 77 Id at 1415. 
 78 Id at 1415–16. 
1130 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1117 
 
the court could not fashion an equitable remedy, though else-
where in the opinion he concluded the opposite.79 Posner noted 
that finding a political question would cast doubt on the justicia-
bility of apportionment cases as well.80 Nonetheless, Posner ulti-
mately dismissed the case as nonjusticiable—on prudential 
standing grounds.81 He held that the plaintiffs were not in “the 
zone of interests” of the Census Clause, thus adopting the “cause 
of action theory” of standing.82 In this view, standing is nothing 
but the merits question of whether the relevant law provides 
someone in the plaintiff’s position with a cause of action. 
In another case, involving the Interior Department’s nonrec-
ognition of an Indian tribe, Judge Posner rejected the notion that 
the political question doctrine barred jurisdiction.83 While ac-
knowledging that recognition of sovereigns is a classic political 
question, Posner held that this does not apply to Indian tribes, in 
which the imponderables of “the conduct of foreign affairs [and] 
judicial ignorance of those affairs” are not implicated.84 This of 
course ignores the question of whether and to what extent Indian 
tribes are regarded as independent sovereigns with whom the 
United States maintains political relations, or rather simply con-
cludes that they are not.85 
III.  STANDING AS A DOCKET MANAGEMENT TOOL 
Posner’s skepticism about Article III standing restrictions 
contrasts, at first glance, with his robust application of prudential 
standing rules and other subconstitutional limitations on federal 
jurisdiction. A close analysis shows they are motivated by com-
mon ideas. Posner essentially sees standing, viewed in its best 
light, as performing a function similar to the statutory amount-
in-controversy requirement in diversity jurisdiction—preventing 
the inundation of the federal courts: “[T]he solidest grounds [to 
 
 79 Id at 1417–18. 
 80 Tucker, 958 F2d at 1417–18. See also United States Department of Commerce v 
Montana, 503 US 442, 458 (1992) (“As our previous rejection of the political question doc-
trine in this context should make clear, the interpretation of the apportionment provisions 
of the Constitution is well within the competence of the Judiciary.”). 
 81 Tucker, 958 F2d at 1418–19. 
 82 See id. 
 83 Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc v United States Department of the 
Interior, 255 F3d 342, 347–48 (7th Cir 2001). 
 84 Id at 347. 
 85 Yet Posner went on to cite a variety of analogies involving relations with foreign 
countries in the course of the opinion. Id at 347–48. 
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justify standing limitations] are practical . . . to prevent the fed-
eral courts from being overwhelmed by cases.”86 Standing in his 
view—which finds little support in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence—is essentially a flexible tool for the allocation of judicial 
resources, an overtheorized docket management device.87 Thus, in 
several cases, he adopted a broad notion of Article III standing 
but ultimately found jurisdiction wanting as a matter of pruden-
tial standing.88 Ironically, prudential standing limitations have 
an even more uncertain “provenance and legitimacy,” as it allows 
federal courts to, at their discretion, reject lawsuits properly 
within their constitutional jurisdiction and which Congress has 
instructed them to adjudicate. 
One interesting corollary of this approach is that, while 
Posner took a critical approach to Article III standing, he was en-
thusiastic about the so-called “prudential standing” doctrine. This 
is a set of entirely judge-made rules that serve purposes similar to 
those of standing but might bar justiciability even when Article III 
limits do not strictly apply. The classic example is jus tertii, which 
prevents plaintiffs from suing based on a real injury to others that 
has an indirect effect on them. Posner embraced prudential 
standing and in several cases dismissed on these grounds even 
after taking a very relaxed approach to Article III standing issues. 
This may seem odd, as prudential standing doctrine is even 
vaguer in form and purpose than Article III standing, which 
Posner himself described as “various”89 and “protean and muta-
ble.”90 But this is why Posner accepted prudential standing—it 
can be “relaxed” or overlooked when (in the view of the court) it is 
useful for practical reasons, but also invoked to husband and pri-
oritize judicial resources. Thus, prudential standing is what 
Judge Posner ultimately thought all standing doctrines should 
be—a discretionary judicial throttle on plaintiffs with potentially 
attenuated interests rather than a hard Article III limit. 
Despite Posner’s liberal position on standing as a jurisdic-
tional limit, he took a strict approach to statutory grants of federal 
jurisdiction over state court issues. In matters such as pendent 
 
 86 American Bottom Conservancy, 650 F3d at 656. 
 87 See People Organized for Welfare & Employment Rights v Thompson, 727 F2d 167, 
172 (7th Cir 1984) (“If passionate commitment plus money for litigating were all that was 
necessary to open the doors of the federal courts, those courts, already overburdened with 
litigation of every description, might be overwhelmed.”). 
 88 See, for example, text accompanying note 80. 
 89 MainStreet Organization of Realtors v Calumet City, 505 F3d 742, 745 (7th Cir 2007). 
 90 Chao, 433 F3d at 992, revd, Hein, 551 US 587 (2007). 
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jurisdiction,91 ancillary bankruptcy jurisdiction,92 settlements of 
federal question cases,93 and jurisdiction over arbitral awards,94 
Posner’s jurisprudence takes a relatively restrictive approach. 
But there is an underlying aspect unifying them: both strands of 
jurisdictional decisions seek to promote judicial economy by 
screening out private, state-law disputes involving unfamiliar 
and particular issues while reserving broad court power over fed-
eral, and often more interesting, issues. 
Take, for example, Posner’s approach to the domestic rela-
tions and probate exceptions to federal jurisdiction. These doc-
trines hold that issues involving marriage and divorce, and the 
probating of an estate, fall outside of the statutory grant of diver-
sity jurisdiction. The traditional reasons for the exceptions reso-
nate with those behind standing requirements—these were not 
the kind of matters heard by English courts of law and equity but 
rather in ecclesiastic courts. Indeed, some argue that this limita-
tion has Article III dimensions. Judge Posner has expressed skep-
ticism, rooted in academic criticism, at both the constitutional 
and “shoddy [ ] historical underpinnings.”95 As with standing, 
Posner expressed disdain for purely historical or formalist ac-
counts for a doctrine: 
Even if the framers of the Judiciary Act of 1789 intended to 
deny to the federal courts jurisdiction over the sorts of cases 
that in England were heard in the ecclesiastical court, they 
presumably had some reason for doing this besides the name 
of the court. And the exception probably would not have per-
sisted as long as it has without a better reason than that it 
may have been implicit in the first judiciary act or that the 
framers of Article III of the Constitution may have intended 
to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the types of 
cases adjudicated in the English common law and chancery 
courts. Rigidly historicist interpretations of the Constitution 
have not been much in vogue for generations.96 
 
 91 See, for example, Dragan v Miller, 679 F2d 712, 716 (7th Cir 1982) (“The interest 
in judicial economy, however, argues very strongly for confining this lawsuit to state 
court.”). 
 92 See, for example, Chapman v Currie Motors, Inc, 65 F3d 78, 82 (7th Cir 1995). 
 93 See, for example, McCall-Bey v Franzen, 777 F2d 1178, 1187 (7th Cir 1985). 
 94 See, for example, Baravati v Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc, 28 F3d 704, 709 (7th 
Cir 1994). 
 95 Dragan, 679 F2d at 713. 
 96 Id at 714 (emphasis added). 
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For Posner, the original intent of Article III is not a good rea-
son for continuing jurisdictional limitations. Nonetheless, Posner 
adopted a broad understanding of the scope of both exceptions, 
holding that they apply to both the statutory grants of diversity 
and federal question jurisdiction, a question that has long divided 
the federal courts of appeals.97 He did so because he believed he 
has discovered “practical reasons” for the doctrine, which, as with 
standing, amount to considerations of “judicial economy.”98 
As with standing,99 Posner’s hostility to historical justifica-
tions may lead him to undervalue practical but poorly articulated 
reasons that inhere in the domestic relations exception doctrine. 
It is true that the colonies did not establish ecclesiastic courts, but 
this does not mean that the special handling of family matters 
lost its relevance in America. Colonies and states often continued 
to keep matters of divorce and probate out of the hands of ordi-
nary common law or equitable courts, instead entrusting them 
either to specialized bodies or even to the legislature itself.100 This 
might suggest that such questions of personal status involve pe-
culiarities of local mores and judgments not well-suited to stand-
ard legal determination, let alone adjudication by a fairly aloof 
federal judge. This understanding of the doctrine gets one to 
largely the same practical result as Posner’s docket management 
interpretation, but perhaps for a more substantial reason. 
IV.  A CRITIQUE OF POSNER’S PRACTICAL STANDING 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Posner “pragmatic” justiciability jurisprudence broadly as-
sails Article III limitations on justiciability as being unrooted in 
the Constitution and as being a formal doctrinal accretion that 
does not serve the policies it is often said to promote. In his view, 
standing doctrine was a twentieth-century development designed 
to limit litigation of rights and interests in the regulatory state, 
an attempt to limit public interest litigation in the straitjacket of 
Anglo-American common law. In short, this criticism sees stand-
ing as an ahistorical attempt to limit, through subject matter ju-
risdiction, the usefulness of new rights that do not resemble those 
that existed at common law. 
 
 97 See Jones v Brennan, 465 F3d 304, 307 (7th Cir 2006). 
 98 Dragan, 679 F2d at 714. 
 99 See Part IV. 
 100 See generally James E. Pfander and Emily K. Damrau, A Non-contentious Account 
of Article III’s Domestic Relations Exception, 92 Notre Dame L Rev 117 (2016). 
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But Posner’s fairly cursory rejection of standing as rooted in 
the text, structure, or meaning of the Constitution relies entirely 
on a few prominent scholarly works written from the late 1960s 
to early 1990s and heavily influenced by the critique of Professor 
Fletcher.101 More recent, and more detailed, historical work has 
found that while the name “standing” is indeed a twentieth-
century label, the underlying restrictions on justiciability have an 
excellent pedigree.102 Thus Posner’s practical critique of standing 
may ironically suffer from a dose of formalism: looking only for 
precedents and justification for standing doctrine in cases that 
use the particular label “standing.” It also suggests some broader 
dangers of judicial reliance on academic scholarship, which is 
prone to changing trends and the emergence of new evidence, and 
which often fails to develop, and in which one may tend to pick 
friends, or at least familiar faces, out of the crowd of divided aca-
demic opinion.103 
Posner’s skepticism of Article III standing’s pedigree is even 
more problematic given his embrace of prudential standing as an 
alternative.104 The prudential doctrine’s legitimacy is even shak-
ier. Unlike constitutional standing, there is no claim that pruden-
tial limits are a mandatory limit on the scope of judicial review. 
While Supreme Court cases rooting the injury-in-fact require-
ment in Article III’s “Cases” and “Controversies” limits may be 
wrong, it is at least making sense to say that the Court cannot 
hear cases that Article III does not extend to. But prudential 
standing is explicitly rooted not in the Constitution but rather in 
a judicially developed set of doctrines, akin to abstention. This 
 
 101 Fletcher, 98 Yale L J at 290–91 (cited in note 59) (describing the standing inquiry 
as properly being about the merits, namely “whether the plaintiff has the right to enforce 
the particular legal duty in question”). 
 102 See, for example, Robert J. Pushaw Jr, Fortuity and the Article III “Case”: A 
Critique of Fletcher’s The Structure of Standing, 65 Ala L Rev 289, 325 (2013) (“The Framers 
and Ratifiers, then, thought that an Article III ‘Case’ involved a violation of a plaintiff’s 
federal legal rights that came about fortuitously—that is, involuntarily as a result of a 
chance occurrence beyond his control, rather than as part of a calculated effort to manu-
facture a lawsuit.”); Anne Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing 
Doctrine?, 102 Mich L Rev 689, 691 (2004) (noting that, although “early American courts 
did not use the term ‘standing’ much,” they “were well aware of the need for proper par-
ties.” They “regularly designated some areas of litigation as being under public control and 
others as being under private control”). 
 103 See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L Rev 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge Harold 
Leventhal as observing that using legislative history is like “looking over a crowd and 
picking out your friends”). 
 104 See Part III. 
2019] Posner’s Pragmatic Justiciability 1135 
 
raises the serious criticism to which abstention doctrines have 
been subject—what authority do federal courts have to refuse to 
hear cases that the Constitution permits them to hear and that 
Congress by statute has put within their jurisdiction? The lan-
guage of the relevant jurisdictional statutes is mandatory 
(“shall”), not precatory. Moreover, the traditional justifications 
for prudential jurisdictional dismissals invoke hoary doctrines 
like equitable discretion, which allowed chancellors to deny relief 
when the public interest demanded it. This would not square well 
with Posner’s “pragmatic” approach. But that leaves prudential 
standing without any anchor in positive law. The considerations 
of judicial economy Posner adduces are within the purview of 
Congress in allocating jurisdiction to and among the courts. 
Congress could have denied jurisdiction in those cases in which 
the courts might think it imprudent but did not. 
Moreover, dismissals on standing grounds are themselves 
costly. Because standing, in the conventional view, goes to the 
Article III jurisdiction of a court, it can and must be raised at any 
time in the litigation. Thus, a dismissal on standing grounds can 
occur even after substantial proceedings on the merits. This is 
justified as a doctrinal matter because, if it emerges that the court 
has no jurisdiction, it simply cannot proceed regardless of effi-
ciency considerations. Yet in Posner’s pragmatic standing doc-
trine, a case can still be dismissed for “prudential” reasons at any 
time105—but such dismissals cannot be justified by an absolute 
lack of jurisdiction to hear the case. More generally, prudential 
standing based on practical docket management considerations 
makes an already vague and unpredictable doctrine even more 
contingent. 
Posner’s rendering of a constitutional doctrine into pragmatic 
terms demonstrates the dangers of such pragmatism—missing 
institutional values imbedded but not always articulated in doc-
trine. Standing is a doctrine that developed over time, reflecting 
a common law view of the judicial function. As with many com-
mon law doctrines, it may serve pragmatic purposes that none of 
the courts that incrementally contributed to it fully realized 
themselves. Indeed, some recent scholars have found that the ap-
parent formalism of standing doctrine nonetheless can be signifi-
cantly utilitarian. Professor Maxwell Stearns has shown that 
 
 105 See MainStreet Organization of Realtors v Calumet City, 505 F3d 742, 747–48 (7th 
Cir 2007). 
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standing can prevent the manipulation of outcomes by agenda-
setters, such as strategic litigants, in situations of intransitive ju-
dicial outcomes, which are likely to be quite common on collegial 
courts.106 My earlier work has shown that in cases in which a uni-
tary government action will affect many similarly situated rights-
holders, standing can prevent inefficient valuations among possi-
ble plaintiffs, who are in effect highly numerous co-owners of a 
right.107 Whether these justifications can account for most stand-
ing decisions, or the Supreme Court’s meandering standing deci-
sions, is unclear. But Posner failed to engage with latter scholar-
ship that responds to the critique of standing in the literature he 
appears most familiar with. 
Posner’s approach also neglects standing’s role as a limita-
tion on judicial power rather than a mere docket management 
tool. Standing is, after all, part of Article III’s limits on judicial 
power, designed to give broader scope for political action without 
judicial interference. One of the major justifications for justicia-
bility restrictions in modern Supreme Court jurisprudence sees 
them as part of the balance of power between the branches. If 
courts are not restricted in their occasions for pronouncing on 
matters of public law by the exogenous circumstances of a partic-
ular kind of thing happening to a plaintiff, they become more like 
a legislature, which can exercise its power whenever it deems 
proper. In this view, the formalism or artificiality of standing re-
strictions are not a bug, but a feature. Moreover, as Justice Scalia 
has emphasized, broad standing to challenge government action 
by similarly affected citizens threatens to bypass the Executive’s 
power to “Take Care” that the laws are faithfully executed. 
Posner does not engage significantly with these arguments. More-
over, by transforming standing into an almost entirely prudential 
doctrine, he transforms it from a limitation on the power of courts 
into just a further degree of power and discretion. 
 
 106 Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social 
Choice, 83 Cal L Rev 1309, 1405–12 (1995); Maxell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: 
Historical Evidence, 144 U Pa L Rev 309, 330 (1995). 
 107 Kontorovich, 93 Va L Rev at 1667 (cited in note 6) (“Standing allows courts to 
bypass the problems of high transaction costs and strategic behavior by attempting to 
replicate the outcome of the bargaining that would have taken place in a low transaction-
cost environment.”). 
